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COMMENT 
CALIFORNIA'S ANTISTALKING 
STATUTE: THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF 
INTENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, California enacted the United States' first anti-
stalking law, thereby creating the crime of stalking.1 This new 
law prohibited repeatedly following or harassing another per-
son and making a credible threat that causes the person to fear 
bodily harm.2 Following California's lead, all fifty states and 
the federal government enacted laws that address stalking.3 
1. See AMERICAN PRosECUTORS REsEARCH INSTITUTE, STALKING: PRoSECUTORS 
CONVICT AND REsTRICT 1 (1997) !hereinafter MA.P.R.I."). 
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 64S.9(a) (Deering Supp. 1998). Section 64S.9(a) states: 
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or har-
asses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent 
to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the 
safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking, 
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year 
or by a fme of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both 
the fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 
Id. 
3. See A.P.R.I., supra note 1, at 1. ALA. CODE §§ 13a-S-90 to 13a-S-94 (1995); 
ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.41 2S0 to 11.41 270 (Michie 1995); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923 
(West Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
648.9 (Deering Supp. 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West Supp. 1997); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181c to 53a-181d (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504(b) (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ lS-5-90 to lS-5-91 (1997); HAw. 
REv. STAT. § 711-110S.4 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (1997); 720 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. ANN. §§ 5/12-7.3 to 5/12-7.4 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-10-1 to 
35-45-10-5 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. 
221 
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Since 1990, prosecutors have learned that in order to effec-
tively protect victims, antistalking laws must be broad in scope, 
carry substantial penalties, and pass constitutional muster.4 
Convicted stalkers have repeatedly attacked the law as uncon-
stitutiona1.5 All such challenges have failed. However, the 
California legislature has clarified and strengthened the anti-
stalking law through a series of revisions over the past eight 
years.s Today, the antis talking law is broad in scope and has 
repeatedly passed constitutional scrutiny. However, the level 
of intent that the antistalking statute currently requires could 
pose problems for prosecutors by allowing accused stalkers to 
ANN. § 21-3438 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.130 to 508.150 (Banks-Baldwin 
1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 210-A (West Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121B (1996); MAss. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1997); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 750.41h to 750.4li 
(West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
97-3-107 (Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-220 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.02 to 28-311.05 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. § 
200.575 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a (Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-
10 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3A-3 to 30-3A-4 (Michie Supp. 1997); 
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.13 to 120.15 (McKinney 1998) (information is for New York's 
menacing law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-
07.1 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.211 to 2903.215 (Anderson 1996); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1998); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.730 to 
163.750 (Supp. 1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. 
LAws §§ 11-59-1 to 11-59-3 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-3-1700 to 16-3-1840 
(Law Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 22-19a-1 to 22-19a-7 (Michie Supp. 1997); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (1997); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (West 1998); 
TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 
(Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1061 to 1063 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-60.3 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. 
CODE § 61-2-9a (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. 940.32 (West 1996); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 
(Michie 1997). The federal government's antis talking law is known as the Interstate 
Punishment and Prevention Act of 1996. 18 U.S.C. § 2261. This law criminalized that 
act of crossing a state line to injure or harass another person. See id. See A.P.R.I., 
supra note I, at 37-38. 
4. See A.P.R.I, supra note I, at 1. 
5. See People V. Falck, 52 Cal. App. 4th 287 (1997) (term "safety" is not unconsti-
tutionally vague); People V. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223 (1996) (the term "credible 
threat" is not unconstitutionally vague); People V. Tran, 47 Cal. App. 4th 253 (1996) 
(the term "harasses" is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant who 
believed his actions served a legitimate purpose); People V. McClelland, 42 Cal. App. 
4th 144 (1996) (requirement that stalking offense be classified as a felony if it violates 
an existing court order is not unconstitutionally vague, language of court order does 
not have to mirror the language of the antistalking statute); People V. Heilman, 25 Cal. 
App. 4th 391 (1994) (the term "repeatedly" is not unconstitutionally vague in context of 
entire statute). 
6. See CPC § 646.9. Revisions were enacted in 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. See 
id. 
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escape liability by asserting a defense of lack of specific intent.7 
The law is therefore in need of revision. 
. Part II of this comment will outline the history of the anti-
stalking statute and present several stalkers' profiles.8 It will 
also discuss the statutory protections that were available to 
victims in California prior to the enactment of antistalking 
legislation and outline the revisions that led to the develop-
ment of the current statute, particularly the revisions to the 
intent requirement.9 Finally, Part II will discuss California's 
antis talking legislation as it stands today and examine the 
challenges that have been brought against the constitutionality 
of the statute.lO 
Part III will outline and analyze the National Institute of 
Justice's Model Antistalking Code.ll This Model Code was de-
veloped to provide state legislators with an example of anti-
stalking legislation that would be enforceable, address the legal 
and practical issues related to stalking, and survive constitu-
tional challenges.l2 Part III will also compare California's anti-
stalking law to the Model Code and discuss the differences and 
similarities between the two approaches to stalking crimes.l3 
Part IV will discuss People v. Halgren, a case involving a 
convicted stalker who unsuccessfully challenged the constitu-
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (Deerings Supp 1998). Section 646.9(g) 
states: 
For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or 
written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combina-
tion of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent 
to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for 
his or her safety or the safety of his or her family and made with the 
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is 
the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the 
safety of his or her family. It is not necessary to prove that the defen-
dant had the intent to actually carry out the threat. 
Id. 
8. See discussion infra section II.A and II.D. 
9. See discussion infra section II.C and II.D. 
10. See discussion infra section II.E and II.F. 
11. See discussion infra Part III. 
12. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL AN· 
TISTALKING CODE FOR STATES 8-9 (1993) [hereinafter "N.I.J."J. 
13. See discussion infra Part III. 
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tionality of California's antistalking statute.14 In 1994, Earl 
Halgren was convicted of stalking Melissa Gonzales.15 Hal-
gren's activities included following Gonzales to work, sur-
veilling her office, and making numerous phone calls to her 
home and workplace in which he made several threatening 
statements.16 Although Halgren was convicted, his defense and 
the sentencing court's comments demonstrate that the anti-
stalking statute's current intent requirement is a potential 
weakness of the law. Part IV will also outline the differences 
between specific and general intent and present a hypothetical 
stalking scenario to better illustrate the weakness in Califor-
nia's antistalking law.17 
Finally, Part V will propose a legislative revision to Califor-
nia's antistalking statute that would replace the existing spe-
cific intent requirement with a general intent requirement.IS 
The antistalking laws of several states, including Washington, 
incorporate a general intent standard and have withstood con-
stitutional scrutiny.19 Part V will discuss the proposed 
amendment to California's antistalking law as well as Wash-
ington's current antis talking law.2o Finally, Part V will apply 
the proposed general intent standard to People v. Halgren and 
the hypothetical scenario and demonstrate how it would have 
affected the outcome of those cases.21 In doing so, the benefits 
of the general intent standard will become clear. 
14. See discussion section IV.B. See People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223 
(1996). 
15. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App 4th at 1226. 
16. See id. at 1226-28. 
17. See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969). A statute contains a general in-
tent standard when ~the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a par-
ticular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future conse-
quence." 1d. at 378. A statute contains a specific intent standard when ~the definition 
refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional conse-
quence." 1d. 
18. See discussion section VA 
19. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1)(c) (West Supp. 1998); State v. Lee, 
917 P.2d 159 (1996). 
20. See discussion infra section V.A and V.B. 
21. See discussion infra section V.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Stalking initially captured public attention after an ob-
sessedfan stalked and killed actress Rebecca Schaeffer in 
1989, and after the news media reported that an obsessed fan 
was persistently harassing TV personality David Letterman in 
the early 1990's.22 Although celebrities receive the majority of 
publicity and public attention, they are actually involved in 
only seventeen percent of stalking cases.23 More frightening is 
that as many as 200,000 people are currently being stalked in 
the United States today, the majority of whom are women.24 
The crime of stalking is defined as "willful, malicious and 
repeated following or harassing of another person combined 
with a credible threat. "25 While stalking requires following or 
harassing, not all such activity rises to the level of seriousness 
that is classified as stalking. Initially, a stalker's behavior may 
be nothing more than bothersome and annoying.26 A stalker 
whose conduct is merely annoying may not realize that his be-
havior is prohibited.27 In many such cases, a call or visit from 
the police is generally sufficient to notify the stalker that his 
behavior is unacceptable and to put a stop to it.28 In more seri-
ous cases, however, where a call or visit from the police is not 
sufficient to convince the stalker to stop the behavior, the 
stalker may have a mental disorder which contributes to his 
obsession.29 If not checked, the stalker's obsession with the 
22. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL AN-
TISTALKING CODE FOR STATES 5 (1993). 
23. See Tatia Jordan, Note, TIu! Efficacy of tlu! California Stalking Law: Survey-
ing its Evolution, Extracting Insights from Domestic Violence Cases, 6 HAsTINGS 
WOMEN'S L.J. 363, 363 (1995). 
24. CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, The Library of Congress, Stalking: Re-
cent Developments 96-832 GOV 2 (October 17, 1996) [hereinafter "C.R.S."J. An esti-
mated one in every twelve American women will become a victim of stalking at some 
time in her life. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 1. 
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (Deering Supp. 1998). 
26. See Telephone Interview with Michael Hamilton, Inspector, San Francisco Po-
lice Department (Sept. 15, 1997) [hereinafter "Hamilton"). 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See Michael A. Zona, A Comparative Study of Erotomanic and Obsessional 
Subjects in a Forensic Sample, 38 J. FORENSIC SCI. 894, 894 (1993). Dr. Zona's study 
identified three mental disorders that commonly afDict stalkers: erotomania, love 
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victim may grow~ As a result, the behavior that began as 
merely bothersome or annoying can escalate into violence, and 
may end in the victim's injury, or even death.30 
A. THE PROFILE OF A STALKER 
Although stalking behavior has long been acknowledged as 
problematic, it was not recognized as a crime until California 
took legislative action in 1990.31 Relatively few studies exist 
that fully explore the psyche of the stalker, in part because this 
crime has only recently been recognized.32 However, it is clear 
that a multitude of factors combine to create stalking 
behavior.33 For example, stalkers may be male or female.34 
They may be "motivated by anger, revenge, jealousy, absolute 
fantasy, or delusion. tt35 In 1993, Dr. Michael Zona of the Uni-
versity of Southern California School of Medicine identified 
three mental disorders that may prompt one person to stalk 
another: erotomania, love obsession, and simple obsession.3s 
1. Erotomanic Stalkers 
According to Dr. Zona's study, erotomanic stalkers com-
monly believe that the object of their obsession, who is either of 
a higher socioeconomic class or is an unattainable figure, such 
as a movie star or political figure, passionately loves them.37 
Generally, no prior relationship exists between the stalker and 
the victim. Erotomanic stalkers are usually women and their 
obsession and simple obsession. The study was based on 74 stalking cases handled by 
the LAPD's Threat Management Unit in 1991. See m. 
30. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 49. 
31. See AMERICAN PROSECUTORS REsEARCH INSTITUTE STALKING, PROSECUTORS 
CONVICT AND RESTRICT 1 (1997). 
32. See Zona, supra note 29. While this study is not particularly recent, it has 
been cited as definitive in studies and articles published as recently as 1997. A.P.R.I., 
supra note 1, at 15. 
33. See A.P.R.I., supra note 1, at 15. 
34. See m. While it is true that stalkers can be men or women, the majority of 
stalkers are men. See Zona, supra note 29, at 897. Therefore, this article will refer to 
stalkers in the masculine and victims in the feminine for ease of reference. 
35. A.P.R.I., supra note 1, at 15. 
36. See Zona, supra note 29, at 894-96. 
37. See A.P.R.I., supra note 1, at 15. 
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victims are usually men.38 This is the opposite of the general 
population of stalkers and victims.39 Erotomanic stalkers may 
continue to contact their victim for up to nineteen months and 
may maintain their obsession for up to 125 months.40 These 
stalkers are most likely to initiate contact by writing letters, 
making telephone calls, and appearing at their victim's home, 
although these visits do not necessarily involve face-to-face 
contact.41 The erotomanic stalker is the least likely to become 
violent because this type of stalker rarely initiates face-to-face 
contact with the object of his obsession.42 
2. Love Obsessional Stalkers 
Love obsessional stalkers, like erotomanic stalkers rarely 
have a prior personal relationship with their victim.43 How-
ever, unlike erotomanic stalkers, love obsessional stalkers are 
most often men who suffer from an additional mental disorder, 
such as schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, or schizoaffec-
tive disorder.44 Additionally, unlike erotomanic stalkers, love 
obsessional stalkers do not believe that they are loved by their 
victim.45 Women are typically the victims of love obsessional 
stalkers.46 These stalkers may contact their victim for up to 
nine months, although they may maintain their obsession for 
up to twelve years.47 Love obsessional stalkers most often con-
tact their victim through letters and phone calls.48 
38. See Zona, supra note 29, at 897-98 & Table 3. 
39. See id. at 898 & Table 3. 
40. See id. at 899 & Table 4. 
41. See id. at 899 & Table 5. 
42. See Zona, supra note 29, at 899 & Table 5. 
43. See id. at 901. 
44. See id. 
45. See AP.R.I, supra note 1, at 16. 
46. See id. at 898 & Table 2. 
47. See id. at 901. 
48. Seeid. 
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3. Simple Obsessional Stalkers 
The most dangerous type of stalker is the simple obsessional 
stalker.49 He is usually a male who has had a prior relation-
ship with his victim, who is most often a female.50 The prior 
relationship between the stalker and the victim need not have 
been intimate. 51 The stalker could have been anything from a 
casual acquaintance to a former lover.52 The outstanding char-
acteristic of this group is that the stalking behavior is almost 
always triggered by a single event, either the termination of 
the relationship or the perception by the stalker that the victim 
is mistreating him.53 As a result of the triggering event, the 
stalker seeks either to restore the relationship or to exact retri-
bution upon the victim.54 The simple obsessional stalker is the 
most dangerous type of stalker because he is the most likely of 
the three types to engage in person-to-person confrontation and 
to destroy the victim's property or physically harm the victim.55 
B. EFFECT OF STALKING ON THE VICTIM 
Stalkers' behavior has a tremendous detrimental impact on 
their victims. Stalking commonly destroys the victim's sense of 
privacy.56 Frequently, the result is paranoia and constant fear: 
fear of others, fear of sleep, or fear of the unknown.57 This may 
cause the victim to withdraw from social activity and make it 
impossible for her to undertake activities that were previously 
commonplace in her life.58 In addition, stalking often disrupts 
the victim's relationships with others.59 Overall, the victim 
bears a great physical and emotional burden as a result of 
stalking. 
49. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 901-02. 
50. See id. at 902. 
51. See id. at 896. 
52. See id. 
53. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 901. 
54. See id. at 896. 
55. See id. at 902. 
56. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 27. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
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C. BEFORE THE ANTISTALKING STATUTE: TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDERS AND STATUTES PROSCRIBING TERRORIST 
THREATS AND ANNOYING TELEPHONE CALLS 
A stalker's behavior often begins as harassment. In many 
stalking situations, the initial harassment may not involve 
physical confrontation. However, the harassment can escalate 
to physical contact and even violence.so Prior to the enactment 
of antistalking legislation, California's statutory scheme did 
not allow police to intervene and protect victims who were be-
ing harassed, but where the harassment stopped short of 
physical confrontation.61 California's antistalking law was the 
first law that enabled the police to get involved in a harassing 
situation before the harassment resulted in physical confronta-
tion. 
While in most cases prior to the enactment of antistalking 
legislation the police lacked the authority to intervene, several 
statutes existed which permitted the police to offer some pro-
tection to the victim, but only if a narrowly defined set of cir-
cumstances existed.62 These statutes protected victims by al-
lowing a judge to issue a temporary restraining order and al-
lowed prosecution of people who made terrorist threats or 
placed annoying telephone calls to the victim. 
1. Temporary Restraining Orders 
Prior to the enactment of California's antistalking law, the 
temporary restraining order ("TRO") was the most widely used 
of the available tools63 and is still an important part of the pro-
60. See Hamilton, supra note 26. 
61. See id. 
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 527.6 (Deering 1995) (providing for the issuance of 
temporary restraining orders); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (Deering Supp. 1998) (pro-
hibiting annoying telephone calls), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (prohibiting terrorist 
threats). 
63. See Heather M. Stearns, Comment, Stalking Stuffers: A Reuolutionary Law to 
Keep Predators Behind Bars, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1026, 1035 (1995). See CPC § 
527.6. M(A) A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subsection (b) may 
seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting harassment as pro-
vided in this section. (B) For the purposes of this section, "harassment" is a knowing 
9
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tection and prosecution process today.64 A TRO is a protective 
court order that prohibits a stalker from further harassing the 
victim.65 Such protective orders can serve as the first formal 
notice to the stalker that his behavior is unwelcome and that 
further harassing behavior will be regarded as criminal.66 In 
order to obtain a TRO, the victim must first demonstrate that 
the harassment would cause a reasonable person to suffer sub-
stantial emotional distress.67 Second, the victim must demon-
strate that she actually suffered emotional distress.68 Until 
recently, a TRO was necessary to the stalking prosecution pro-
cess.69 Today, however, a first stalking offense may be prose-
cuted as' a misdemeanor or a felony, regardless of whether a 
restraining order is in effect.70 The first stalking offense is 
known as a "wobbler" because the prosecuting attorney has 
discretion to charge the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony 
depending on the circumstances and seriousness of the 
offense.71 If a restraining order is in effect when the stalking 
behavior occurs, the statute removes the prosecuting attorney's 
discretion and the crime must be charged as a felony, carrying 
a penalty of incarceration in state prison for up to four years.72 
For enforcement of restraining orders to be effective, victims 
must be informed of their rights both at the time they seek and 
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, an-
noys or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose." Id. 
64. When a TRO is in effect, a stalking offense in violation of the order must be 
prosecuted as a felony. See CPC § 646.9(b). "Any person who violates subsection (a) 
when there is a temporary restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in 
effect prohibiting the behavior described in subsection (a) against the same party, shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years." Id. 
65. See CPC § 527.6. 
66. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 75. 
67. See CPC § 527.6(b). "The course of conduct must be such as would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause 
substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff." Id. 
68. See id. 
69. See infra discussion section II.D. Revisions to the antistalking statute elimi-
nated the requirement that the victim obtain a TRO before the stalker could be 
charged with a felony. 
70. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 17. 
71. See Telephone Interview with Susan BreaU, Assistant District Attorney, San 
Francisco District Attorney's Office (September 15, 1997) !hereinafter "BreaUj. 
72. See CPC § 646.9(b). 
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after they have obtained a TRO.73 Also, the courts must moni-
tor compliance by the stalker, victims must report violations, 
and police, prosecutors, and judges must respond sternly to 
reported violations.74 As a result, the burden of effective pro-
tection falls on many shoulders, not just those of the police or 
prosecutors. For this reason, TRO's may be very limited in 
their effectiveness. 
2. Conviction for Annoying Telephone Calls and Terrorist 
Threats 
California Penal Code section 653m prohibits a person from 
making telephone calls intending to annoy the recipient?5 
Calls placed to a recipient's home containing obscene language 
or threats that the caller will inflict injury on the recipient are 
classified as misdemeanor offenses.76 Similar calls placed to 
the recipient's place of business are also classified as misde-
meanors but carry a penalty of a fine of up to $1,000 or impris-
onment in a county jail.77 
73. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 78. 
74. See id. at 77. 
75. CPC § 653m(a). Section 653m(a) states: 
Every person who, with intent to annoy, telephones another and ad-
dresses to or about the other person any obscene language or addresses 
to the other person any threat to inflict injury to the person or property 
of the person addressed or any member of his or her family, is guilty or 
a misdemeanor. 
[d. 
76. See id. CPC § 653m(b). The statute differentiates between calls placed to the 
recipient's home and calls placed to the recipient's place of business. "Every person 
who makes repeated telephone' calls with intent to annoy another person at his or her 
residenre, is, whether or not conversation ensues from making the telephone call, 
guilty of a misdemeanor" (emphasis added). [d. 
77. See CPC § 653m(c). Section 653m(c) states: 
Every person who makes repeated telephone calls with the intent to 
annoy another person at his or ber place of work is guilty of a misde-
meanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000) or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, 
or by both the fme and imprisonment... This subdivision applies only if 
one or both of the following circumstances exist: (1) There is a tempo-
rary restraining order, an injunction, or any other court order, or any 
combination of these court orders, in effect prohibiting the behavior de-
scribed in this section. (2) The person who makes repeated telephone 
calls with the intent to annoy another person at his or her place of 
work, totaling more than 10 times in a 24-hour period, whether or not 
conversation ensues from making the telephone call, and the repeated 
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The statute prohibiting terrorist threats, Cal. Penal Code 
section 422, offered additional protection to a stalking victim 
prior to the enactment of antistalking legislation in 
California.78 This statute prohibits a person from making 
threats of death or great bodily injury.79 The statute requires 
proof that the person making the threat intends for the recipi-
ent to interpret it as a threat.80 The threat must be specific 
enough to make the recipient expect that it will be carried out 
immediately.81 The statute also requires that the recipient 
reasonably fear for her safety or the safety of her immediate 
family.82 The penalty for violation of this statute is imprison-
ment in county jail or state prison for up to one year.83 
Statutes proscribing annoying telephone calls or terrorist 
threats are problematic in the context of stalking because their 
application is too narrow to provide adequate protection to the 
stalking victim.84 The restrictive language of the statutes re-
quires prosecutors to prove that the stalker made an uncondi-
tional and unequivocal threat of immediate harm or engaged in 
specific behaviors, such as placing harassing, obscene phone 
telephone calls are made to the workplace of an adult or fully emanci-
pated minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabi-
tant, or person with whom the person has a child or has had a dating or 
engagement relationship or is having a dating or engagement relation-
ship" (emphasis added). 
Id. 
If a TRO is not in effect, the law requires that a narrowly defined relation-
ship between the caller and the recipient exist. See id. 
78. See CAL. PE.NAL CODE § 422. Section 422 states: 
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result 
in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific in-
tent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no in-
tent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circum-
stances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immedi-
ate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of pur-
pose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby 
causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own 
safety or forbis or her immediate family's safety, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprison-
ment in the state prison. 
Id. 
79. See id. 
BO. See id. 
81. See id. The person need not intend to carry out the threat. Id. 
82. See CPC § 422. 
83. See id. 
84. See Stearns, supra note 63, at 1048. 
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calls to the recipient's home or place of business. The terrorist 
threat and annoying telephone call statutes were designed to 
protect victims from specific instances of threatening or an-
noying activities. They do not protect against a series of acts 
that, when viewed as a whole, represent a harassing or threat-
ening course of conduct. To remedy this deficiency in the statu-
tory scheme, California's legislature enacted the antistalking 
statute to protect victims from a cumulative series of individual 
acts that, when viewed in context with each other, represent a 
threat or harassment. 
D. HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA'S ANTISTALKING STATUTE 
California's antistalking statute, enacted in 1990, was the 
first in the country to criminalize harassing behavior. The new 
law eliminated any requirement of physical confrontation. By 
eliminating this requirement, the California legislature essen-
tially created a new crime.85 Since a model statute to which 
California could compare its new antistalking law did not exist, 
the first incarnation of the law contained numerous weak-
nesses. These weaknesses were revealed in a series of cases in 
which convicted stalkers challenged the law.a6 Legislators 
have revised the statute four times since 1990, thereby 
strengthening the law.a7 
In its original form, the statute was narrower in scope and 
provided far less protection to the victim than it does today.88 
85. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 1. 
86. See People v. Falck, 52 Cal. App. 4th 287 (1997) (term "safety" is not unconsti-
tutionally vague); People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223 (1996) (the term "credible 
threat" is not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Tran, 47 Cal. App. 4th 253 (1996) 
(the term "harasses" is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant who 
believed his actions served a legitimate purpose); People v. McClelland, 42 Cal. App. 
4th 144 (1996) (requirement that stalking offense be classified as a felony if it violates 
an existing court order is not unconstitutionally vague, language of court order does 
not have to mirror the language of the antistalking statute); People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. 
App. 4th 391 (1994) (the term "repeatedly" is not unconstitutionally vagUe in context of 
entire statute). 
ill. 
87. See CPC § 646.9. Revisions were enacted in 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. See 
88. See ill. Section A of the original statute read as follows: 
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or har-
asses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent 
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Stalking was defined as the willful, malicious, and repeated 
following or harassing of another person, combined with a 
credible threat that causes the person to fear great bodily in-
jury or death.89 The definition of "credible threat" required 
that the stalker threaten the life or safety of the victim, with 
the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat, causing 
the victim to reasonably fear for her safety.90 The first offense 
was a misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of not more 
than one year in county jail and/or a rme of up to $1,000.91 A 
second offense occurring within seven years of the first offense, 
or a first offense in violation of a court order, was punishable as 
a misdemeanor or a felony, depending upon the seriousness of 
the crime.92 
In 1992, the legislature expanded the defmition of "credible 
threat" to include threats to family members.93 This was a sig-
to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury is 
guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment in a county 
jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one thou-
sand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment. 
[d. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. Section E of the original statute read as follows: 
For the purposes of this section, a ·credible threat" means a threat 
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so 
as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear 
for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat 
to cause great bodily injury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7. 
[d. 
91. See CPC § 646.9. Section B of the original statute read as follows: 
Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary re-
straining order or an injunction, or both, in effect prohibiting the be-
havior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, is punish-
able by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a 
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine 
and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 
[d. 
92. See id. Section C of the original statute read as follows: 
A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a 
prior conviction under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and in-
volving an act of violence or ·a credible threat" of violence, as dermed in 
subdivision (e), is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not 
more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in 
the state prison. 
[d. 
93. See id. Section F of the statute was amended in 1992 to read as follows: 
For the purposes of this section, a ·credible threat" means a threat 
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so 
14
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nificant revision because stalkers sometimes exploit a victim's 
family and friends in order to reach the victim.94 The 1992 re-
visions also increased the classification of second offenses to a 
felony, providing for incarceration for up to one year and a fine 
of up to $1,000.95 
In 1993, the California legislature revised the statute sig-
nificantly. Among the revisions, the legislature expanded the 
definition of "credible threat" to include threats implied by a 
"course of conduct." The legislature also expanded the intent 
requirement from threats of death or great bodily harm to 
threats intended to place the victim in reasonable fear for her 
safety or the safety of her family.96 Finally, they increased 
penalties for the second offense to incarceration for up to four 
years in state prison.97 
as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear 
for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. The 
threat must be against the life of, of a threat to cause great bodily in-
jury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7. 
[d. 
94. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 17. 
95. See CPC §646.9. Section C of the statute was amended in 1992 to read as fol-
lows: 
A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a 
prior conviction under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and in-
volving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as dermed in 
subdivision (0, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not 
more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, 
or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state 
prison. 
[d. 
96. See id. Section E of the statute was amended in 1993 to read as follows: 
For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means. a verbal or 
written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combina-
tion of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent 
and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the per-
son who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her 
safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. 
[d. 
97. See id. Section B of the statute was amended in 1993 to read as follows: "Any 
person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary restraining order, in-
junction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the behavior described in subdi-
vision (a) against the same party, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for two, three, or four years." Additional revisions included giving the court 
discretion to classify the first offense as a misdemeanor or felony, depending upon the 
circumstances of the crime; increasing the penalty for violation of a restraining order to 
a felony offense; expanding the definition of immediate family to the language found in 
15
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During the hearings in which the legislature discussed the 
1993 amendments, California Assemblyman Bob Epple ex-
plained that by expanding the scope of the fear requirement 
and allowing the courts to consider threats implied by conduct, 
the changes would "prevent stalkers from being able to hide 
behind California's lenient antistalking laws. ~ He believed 
that the changes would send a clear message that California 
takes stalking crimes very seriously.99 Assemblywoman Jackie 
Speier noted that increased penalties would decrease the dis-
parity between the suffering and damage incurred by a stalk-
ing victim and the current penalties to the stalker.1OO The leg-
islature approved Assemblyman Epple's proposed amendments 
by an overwhelming majority.101 
The legislature amended the statute again in 1994 and 
1995.102 The 1994 amendments included increasing the pen-
alty for second offenses to mandatory incarceration; approving 
a provision requiring law enforcement officials to notify victims 
prior to their stalkers' release from prison; and giving law en-
forcement officials the power to prosecute stalkers who contin-
ued to threaten their victims while in jail. In 1995, the legisla-
ture expanded the definition of "credible threat" to the current 
language. loa 
the current statute; and giving the court discretion to recommend that the stalker 
undergo rehabilitative treatment as a condition of parole. 
See id. 
98. Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 1178 Before the Assembly Committee on Public 
Safety (statement by Bob Epple, Chair), Apr. 13, 1993 [hereinafter "Epple"]. 
99. See id. 
100. See Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 284 Before the Assembly Committee on Pub-
lic Safety (statement by Assemblywoman Jackie Speier), Apr. 20, 1993 [hereinafter 
"Speier"]. 
101. See Committee Report for 1993 Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1178, 1993-1994 Reg. 
Sess. Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 22, 1993). The vote totaled 
70 ayes and 0 noes. See id. 
102. See CPC § 646.9. 
103. See CPC § 646.9(g). Section 646.9(g) states: 
For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or 
written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combina-
tion of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent 
to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for 
his or her safety or the safety of his or her family and made with the 
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is 
16
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E. CALIFORNIA'S EXISTING ANTISTALKING LAw 
Today, California Penal Code section 646.9 defines stalking 
as willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing 
another person and making a credible threat with the intent to 
place the victim in reasonable fear for her safety, or the safety 
of her immediate family.l04 The statute is triggered only when 
the stalker makes a credible threat with the specific intent to 
cause the victim to reasonably fear for her safety and commits 
one of two prohibited acts - either willful, malicious, and re-
peated following; or harassment.lo5 The stalker's first offense 
can be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a felony, with penalties 
varying depending upon the classification and seriousness of 
the crime.106 Additionally, the court may require the stalker to 
register as a sex offender or to participate in counseling as a 
condition of probation.lo7 The court also has discretion to issue 
the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the 
safety of his or her family. It is not necessary to prove that the defen-
dant had the intent to actually carry out the threat. 
[d. 
Other amendments included giving the court discretion to require that a stalker regis-
ter as a sex offender pursuant to Cal. Penal Code section 290(2Xe) (the decision to do 
this must be based on the court's determination that the stalking took place as a result 
of a sexual compulsion or for sexual gratification) and giving the court the discretion to 
impose a restraining order prohibiting contact between the victim and the stalker for 
up to ten years. See id. 
104. See CPC § 646.9(a). Section 649 (a) states: 
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or har-
asses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent 
to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the 
safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking, 
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year 
or by a rme of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both that fine 
and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison. 
[d. 
105. See Respondent's Brief at 18, People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223 (1996) 
(No. SCD107843) !hereinafter "Respondent's Brief']. 
106. See CPC § 646.9. If it is classified as a misdemeanor it carries a penalty of up 
to $1,000 and/or incarceration in county jail for up to one year. However, if it is classi-
fied as a felony it carries a penalty of incarceration in state prison for up to one year. If 
a court order is in effect, or if the violation is a second offense, the violation is a felony 
carrying a penalty of incarceration in state prison for two to four years. See id. 
107. See CPC § 646.9(d) and 646.9(i). Section (d) states: "In addition to the penal-
ties provided in this section, the sentencing court may order a person convicted of a 
felony under this section to register as a sex offender pursuant to subparagraph (E) or 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 290." 
Section (i) states: 
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a restraining order barring any contact between the stalker 
and the victim for a period of up to ten years.lOB Finally, the 
statute allows law enforcement officials to prosecute stalkers 
who continue to threaten their victims through letters and 
telephone calls from prison.I09 
1. Credible Threat 
California's antis talking statute defines "credible threat" as 
encompassing both verbal and written threats, as well as 
threats implied by a pattern of conduct. no This definition of 
"credible threat" allows prosecutors to consider a broad range 
of stalking activities and to prosecute offenders without prov-
ing that they intended to execute the threat.lll A prosecutor 
must prove only that the stalker intended to cause the victim to 
be afraid and that he had the concurrent ability to carry out his 
threat. 112 
If probation is granted, or the execution of imposition of a sentence is 
suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a 
condition of probation that the person participate in counseling, as 
designated by the court. However, the court, upon a showing of good 
cause, may find that the counseling requirement shall not be imposed. 
[d. 
108. See CPC § 646.9(j). Section 646.9(j) states: 
The sentencing court also shall consider issuing an order restraining 
the defendant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for 
up to ten years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Leg-
islature that the length of any restraining order be based upon the seri-
ousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future viola-
tions, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family. [d. 
109. See CPC § 646.9(g). Section 646.9(g) states: 
For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or 
written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combina-
tion of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent 
to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for 
his or her safety or the safety of his or her family and made with the 
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is 
the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the 
safety of his or her family. It is not necessary to prove that the defen-
dant had the intent to actually carry out the threat. The present incar-
ceration of a person making the threat shall not be a bar to prosecution 
under this section. 
[d. 
110. See id. 
111. See AP.R.I., supra note 1, at 17. 
112. See CPC § 646.9(g). 
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This definition of "credible threat" is problematic because is 
requires the accused stalker to actually intend to cause his vic-
tim to be afraid.u3 This is a specific intent requirement, be-
cause it requires the accused stalker to undertake an act with 
the intent to bring about a particular result.1l4 Under this spe-
cific intent requirement, an accused stalker could potentially 
avoid conviction by presenting one of several defenses, includ-
ing the assertion that he suffers from a mental disorder or that 
he did not form the requisite specific intent. 
As mentioned in Part II.A, a stalker's obsession can be 
driven by a mental disorder which may prevent the stalker 
from understanding the nature of his actions.l15 Because Cali-
fornia's antistalking law contains a specific intent requirement, 
an accused stalker could present evidence that he did not actu-
ally form the specific intent necessary for the commission of the 
crime due to a mental disease or disorder.u~ If successful, this 
assertion provides the accused stalker with a complete defense 
to the charged crime.ll7 
Alternatively, the accused stalker in California could assert 
that he did not intend to cause his victim to be afraid but was 
instead expressing his feelings and opinions. Several convicted 
stalkers have unsuccessfully attempted to overturn their con-
victions by asserting this defense.us Although this defense has 
been unsuccessful, the court has clearly given considerable at-
tention to the assertion. 
113. See id. 
114. See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (1969). 
115. See discussion supra Part II.A 
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (Deering 1985). Evidence of mental disease, 
mental defect, or mental disorder shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity 
to form any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, 
premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed 
the act. Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible 
solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific 
intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific 
intent crime is charged (emphasis added). [d. 
117. See PAULH. RoBINSON, CRIM. L. DEF. § 64, 273 (West 1984). 
118. See People v. Trlin, 47 Cal. App. 4th 253 (1996); People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. 
App. 4th 1223 (1996). 
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2. Course of Conduct 
California's antistalking statute specifically defines "course 
of conduct" as a series of acts evincing a continuity of 
purpose.119 This is a broad definition which allows the police to 
bring charges against a person who harasses his victim as few 
as two times.120 Acts of stalking occurring up to two years from 
each other may be considered as evidence that the stalker has 
engaged in a "course of conduct. "121 This broad definition of 
"course of conduct" provides law enforcement with a tremen-
dous tool with which to prosecute stalkers because it allows 
them to consider a broad range of activities before pressing 
charges. 122 
3. Harass 
California's antistalking statute defines "harass" as a 
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific per-
son that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the 
person.l23 To constitute harassment, the course of conduct 
must be enough cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 
emotional distress.124 Further, the conduct must actually cause 
the victim to suffer substantial emotional distress.l25 
119. See CPC § 646.9(0. "For purposes of this section, "course of conduct" means a 
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, 
evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included 
within the meaning of ' course of conduct .... ld. 
120. See Hamilton, supra note 26. 
121. See id. 
122. See Breall, supra note 71. 
123. See CPC § 646.9(e). Section 646.9(e) states: 
For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and will-
ful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, 
annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legiti-
mate purpose. This course of conduct must be such as would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must ac-
tually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. 
ld. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
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F. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 
SECTION 646.9 
Drafting effective antis talking legislation that will with-
stand constitutional challenge is a complex task. Lawmakers 
must weigh the fear of the victim against the constitutionally 
protected activities of the accused.126 Since the enaction of an-
tistalking legislation in 1990, several stalkers have appealed 
their stalking convictions and have attacked the constitution-
ality of the antistalking statute. Constitutional challenges are 
generally based on the argument that the statute is either void 
for vagueness or is overbroad.127 Although several cases have 
directly challenged the constitutionality of California's anti-
stalking statute, the courts have demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to strike down the statute as unconstitutional.l28 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not comport 
with due process requirements.129 First, due process requires 
that "a statute provide a standard of conduct for those whose 
activities are proscribed. "130 To do this, the statute must be 
definite enough that a person of common intelligence can un-
derstand its meaning and application.l31 However, this re-
quirement "does not preclude the use of ordinary terms" in the 
statute, as long as the terms have a common usage and under-
standing. 132 Second, the statute must provide "a standard for 
police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt. "133 If a stat-
ute meets these two requirements, it will not be found void for 
vagueness. 
126. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, The Library of Congress, Stalking: 
Recent Developments 96-832 GOv 4 (October 17,1996). 
127. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 9. 
128. See People v. Tran, 47 Cal. App. 4th 253 (1996) (stalking behavior is notjusti-
fled by the stalker's unreasonable belief that his activities serve a legitimate purpose); 
People v. McClelland, 42 Cal. App. 4th 144 (1996) (the antis talking law does not re-
quire a court order to mirror the language of the statute in order to be effective); People 
v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 391 (1994) (the term "repeatedly" is not unconstitutionally 
vague). 
129. See People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 391,400 (1994). 
130. [d. 
131. See id. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
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A successful challenge on the basis of overbreadth "must 
demonstrate that [the statute] inhibits a substantial amount of 
protected speech. "134 A statute is not overbroad merely because 
it is possible to conceive of a single impermissible 
application. 135 Rather, the overbreadth of a statute must be 
both real and substantial in relation to its legitimate sweep.l36 
"A statute may not be invalidated as overbroad unless it 
reaches a substantial number of protected activities."137 
III. COMPARISON OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE'S MODEL ANTISTALKING CODE WITH 
CALIFORNIA'S ANTISTALKING STATUTE 
Since California enacted the country's first antistalking law, 
the federal government has also recognized the serious nature 
of stalking crimes and has addressed stalking on a national 
level. l38 In 1993, Congress delegated the task of creating a 
model antistalking statute to the Attorney General.139 In turn, 
the Attorney General delegated this task to the National Insti-
tute of Justice ("N.I.J.") which, in October, 1993, published a 
report titled The Project to Develop a Model Antistalking Code 
for States ("Model Code").14o 
Prior to the publication of the Model Code, state laws ad-
dressing stalking varied widely, resulting in a "hodgepodge of 
flawed statutes."14l The N.I.J. developed the model antistalk-
ing code as an example of antistalking legislation that would 
effectively combat stalking crimes and also withstand constitu-
134. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1231. 
135. See Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
136. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1231. 
137. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982). 
138. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, The Library of Congress, Stalking: 
Recent DeveUJpments 96-832 GOV 3 (October 17, 1996). In addition to the model code, 
the federal government enacted the Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention 
Act of 1996, making it a federal crime to cross state lines to injure or harass another 
person. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (West Supp. 1997). 
139. See C.R.S., supra note 24, at 3-4. 
140. See id. at 4. 
141. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND 
ANTISTALKING LEGISLATION, 4 (Apr. 1996). 
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tional scrutiny.142 As a result of the Model Code, many states 
with antistalking laws amended their existing statutes and 
penal codes to conform to at least some of the Model Code's rec-
ommendations, and eighteen states enacted new laws.l43 
The Model Code recommends several policies for states to 
follow. l44 It encourages legislators to make stalking a felony 
offense and to establish penalties for stalking that reflect and 
are commensurate with the seriousness of the crime.l45 Fur-
ther, it provides criminal justice officials with the authority 
and legal tools to arrest, prosecute, and sentence stalkers.l46 
To assist lawmakers in accomplishing these goals, the Model 
Code discusses several critical concepts, including credible 
threat, intent, and fear. 
142. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL AN· 
TISTALKlNG CODE FOR STATES (1993). 
143. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE AssISTANCE, Regional Seminar Series on Developing 
and Implementing Antistalking Codes 11 June 1996 !hereinafter "B.J.A."J. -Iowa, 
Virginia and Utah amended their statutes to incorporate the language recommended 
by the model code. Wisconsin amended its code to include provisions that are similar 
to those in the model code ... " Id. 
The following states enacted antis talking laws in 1992: Alabama, Ari-
zona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The following states en-
acted antis talking laws in 1993: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Id at nn.2-3. 
144. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 43-44. The following is the text of the model code: 
Any person who (a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed 
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily 
injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family 
or to fear the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her im-
mediate family; and (b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that 
the specific person will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to 
himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family or will be 
placed in reasonable fear of the death or himself or herself or a member 
of his or her immediate family; and (c) whose acts induce fear in the 
specific person of bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his 
or her immediate family or induce fear in the specific person of the 
death of himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; 
is guilty of stalking. 
Id. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
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A. THE CREDIBLE THREAT REQUIREMENT 
Unlike many state antistaIkiIlg statutes, the Model Code 
does not use the term "credible threat. "147 Instead of focusing 
on a threat, which might be construed as requiring an actual 
verbal or written threat, the Model Code focuses on the series 
of acts undertaken by the stalker.l48 In the Model Code, the 
emphasis is on threats implied by a "course of conduct" which, 
when taken in context, would cause a reasonable person to fear 
for her safety.149 
California's antistalking statute, unlike the Model Code, 
uses the term "credible threat."150 However, the 1993 amend-
ment addressed the problem that the Model Code sought to 
avoid by expanding the definition of "credible threat" to include 
threats implied by a "course of conduct. "151 By doing so, Cali-
fornia's statute allows prosecutors to consider the broadest pos-
sible range of activities when bringing charges against a 
stalker. Therefore, it is consistent with the recommendations of 
the Model Code. 
B. THE INTENT REQUIREMENT 
The Model Code incorporates a general intent provision, 
which simply requires that the stalker purposefully engage in 
activities that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily 
injury or death.152 It does not require that the stalker intend to 
cause his victim to be afraid.l53 Stalkers may suffer from a 
mental disorder that causes them to believe that their victim 
will begin to return their feelings of love or affection if properly 
pursued. 1M If this is the case, the stalker's intent may not be to 
147. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 45. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (Deering Supp. 1998). 
151. See CPC § 646.9(e). 
152. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 43. 
153. See id. at 47. The code does not require the stalker to actually intend to cause 
the victim to be afraid, only that the stalker consciously engage in conduct that he 
knows or should know would cause his victim to be afraid. ld. 
154. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 48. 
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cause the victim to be afraid, but to establish a relationship 
with or express his feelings to the victim. 155 The drafters of the 
Model Code believed that the stalker's behavior, rather than 
his motivation, should be the most significant factor in deter-
mining whether to press charges.I56 The Model Code's general 
intent requirement holds the accused stalker responsible for 
his intentional behavior if, at the very least, he should have 
known that his actions would cause the victim to be afraid.I57 
A stalker should know that his actions are unappreciated if he 
was served with a court order or if he was told by the victim 
that she no longer wishes to be contacted. By placing the focus 
on the stalker's behavior, the Model Code effectively eliminates 
the possibility that a stalker could assert a successful defense 
by claiming that he did not intend to cause the victim to be 
afraid, but was instead expressing his feelings and opinions.I58 
As mentioned earlier, California's antistalking law contains 
a specific intent requirement.I59 California's law requires that 
the stalker actually intend to cause the victim to be afraid, al-
though it does not require that he intend to carry out his 
threats. ISO In comparison, the Model Code only requires that 
the stalker intend to undertake specific acts, but does not re-
quire that he intend to cause his victim to be afraid.I61 There-
fore, California's specific intent provision places a greater em-
phasis on the stalker's motives than does the Model Code. As a 
result, California might encounter difficulties in prosecuting a 
stalker who establishes that he did not intend to cause the vic-
tim to be afraid, even if he knew or should have known that his 
actions would have'that result.I62 
155. See id. See also discussion supra Part II.A 
156. See B.J.A, supra note 143, at 4. 
157. See id, at 43-44. 
158, See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 48. 
159. See discussion supra section II.E.1. 
160. See CPC § 646.9(g). 
161. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 43. 
162. Examples of such a situation include People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 
1232 (1996), in which the defendant appealed his stalking conviction on the ground 
that he was merely exercising his constitutional right to free speech, and People v. 
Tran, 47 Cal. App. 4th 253,260 (1996), in which the defendant appealed his stalking 
25
Gregson: California's Antistalking Statute
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
246 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:221 
C. THE FEAR REQllREMENT 
The Model Code requires the victim to actually experience a 
high level of fear: fear of serious bodily injury or death.l63 The 
reason for this strict standard is that stalking statutes crimi-
nalize a series of acts that, individually, might otherwise be 
legitimate conduct, such as making a phone call or writing a 
letter.l64 This strict fear requirement acts as a check on police 
power and ensures that the constitutional rights of the accused 
are protected. 
California's antistalking statute requires that the prose-
cuting attorney prove a lower threshold of fear than the Model 
Code.l65 In California, a stalker need only place his victim in 
reasonable fear for her safety or the safety of her immediate 
family, whereas, under the Model Code, a stalker must place 
the victim in fear of serious bodily injury or death. l66 However, 
while the California statute requires a lower threshold of fear, 
it incorporates the Model Code's requirement of actual fear.167 
The stalker's actions must actually cause the victim to be 
afraid. This actual fear requirement also protects the rights of 
the stalker by requiring that the victim prove she was actually 
placed in fear, and therefore suffered as a result of the stalker's 
actions. 
IV. THE DEFICIENCIES IN CALIFORNIA'S SPECIFIC 
INTENT PROVISION 
In most respects, California's antistalking statute follows or 
exceeds the policies and protections· suggested by the Model 
Code. However, the California legislature did not incorporate 
the Model Code's general intent standard. Instead, as men-
conviction on the ground that he irrationally but honestly believed his actions served a 
legitimate purpose. Both appeals were rejected, but the Court gave significant weight 
and thought to the appellant's arguments. See id. 
163. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 48. 
164. See id. 
165. See CPC § 646.9(g). 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
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tioned earlier, California incorporates a specific intent stan-
dard. l68 This is a weakness because it allows accused stalkers 
to escape liability if they did not specifically intend to cause the 
victim to be afraid, even if they knew or should have known 
that their actions were causing their victim to be afraid. 
A. COMPARISON OF GENERAL INTENT TO SPECIFIC INTENT 
Specific intent is the intent to achieve a result by under-
taking some specific act.1S9 An antistalking statute containing 
a specific intent provision requires the prosecuting attorney to 
prove two things: that the stalker intended to undertake a 
specific act and that the stalker intended to achieve a particu-
lar result. Since the prosecuting attorney must prove both in-
tents, a specific intent standard is a strict standard to meet. 
This is the level of intent currently required by California's an-
tistalking statute. 
In contrast, general intent requires proof of only one intent: 
the intent to undertake a specific act. General intent does not 
require proof that the defendant intended to bring about a spe-
cific result.170 Because general intent does not require proof of 
the defendant's intent to bring about a particular result, the 
prosecution will have an easier time proving general intent. 
General intent is the level of intent required by the Model 
Code. 
B. A CALIFORNIA STALKING CASE UNDER THE CURRENT 
SPECIFIC INTENT STATUTE: PEOPLE v. HALGREN 
In People v. Halgren the California Court of Appeal affirmed 
the stalking conviction of defendant-appellant Earl Halgren 
("Halgren").171 In 1995, Halgren was convicted of stalking 
Melissa Gonzales ("Gonzales") in the San Diego area during 
late 1994.172 On appeal, Halgren challenged the constitution-
168. See id. 
169. See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (1969). 
170. See id. 
171. See People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1226 (1996). 
172. See id. at 1226-28. 
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ality of California's antistalking statute and reasserted his de-
fense that he did not make a "credible threat."173 In California, 
a "credible threat" requires specific intent to cause the victim to 
be afraid.174 Halgren argued that he did not specifically intend 
to cause Gonzales to be afraid.175 Rather, he was exercising his 
right of free speech by expressing his feelings of anger and 
frustration at Gonzales's rejection of his advances.176 In sup-
port of his assertion, Halgren pointed out that his threats were 
"too vague and equivocal to be considered a 'credible threat.,"177 
The Court of Appeal rejected Halgren's assertions and affirmed 
the trial court's judgment. However, Halgren's assertion that 
he did not specifically intend to cause Gonzales to be afraid is 
indicative of the type of defense that could be successful under 
California's specific intent requirement. 
1. Factual and Procedural History 
In September 1994, Melissa Gonzales met Earl Halgren in a 
grocery store where they had a brief conversation.17S During 
their conversation, Halgren learned where Gonzales worked, 
that she had a young son, and that she was divorced.179 Begin-
ning the following day, Halgren called Gonzales at her office 
once a day for the next two days. ISO Each day Halgren asked 
Gonzales to meet him for lunch. lSI On the first day, Gonzales 
refused.ls2 However, on the second day, Gonzales agreed to go 
grocery shopping with him, but insisted that they go in sepa-
rate cars.l83 Although she did not expect him to actually show 
up there, he did.l84 At the store, Halgren seemed "jittery" and 
173. See id. at 1226. 
174. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (Deering Supp. 1998). 
175. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1232. 
176. See id. at 1231-32. 
177. [d. 
178. See Respondent's Brief at 1-2, People v. Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 61 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (1996) (No. SCDl07843). 
179. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1226. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1226-27. 
184. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 105, at 2. 
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"hyper," and Gonzales told him that he was acting strangely.l85 
In response, Halgren ran up and down the aisles slapping his 
calves.l86 Halgren showed her a badge and told her to remem-
ber that he was "really important."187 After this incident, Gon-
zales did not hear from Halgren for several weeks.l88 
On October 26, 1994, Halgren called Gonzales at her 
office.189 Halgren did not immediately identify himself when 
Gonzales picked up the line.l90 During· the call, Halgren told 
Gonzales, "You're going to have to talk to me sometime."191 
When she recognized Halgren's voice, Gonzales hung up the 
phone.l92 After this call, Gonzales and a co-worker began 
keeping a log of his calls.193 He called several more times that 
day.l94 During one call, Gonzales told Halgren that she did not 
want to speak to him and that she had called the police, who 
were setting a telephone trap.195 
That night, although she had never given Halgren her home 
phone number, she received a message from him on her home 
answering machine.l96 He began to call her at home repeat-
edly, and made several threatening statements.l97 The calls 
and threats terrified her and caused her to fear for the safety of 
herself and her son.l98 In an attempt to protect them, Gonzales 
changed her home telephone to an unlisted number and noti-
fied her son's preschool about the harassment.l99 
185. See id. at 3. 
186. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1227. 
187. [d. 
188. See id. 
189. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 105, at 3. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. 
192. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1227. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. See id. 
197. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1227. 
198. See id. at 1227-28. 
199. See id. at 1228. 
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Beginning on October 28, 1994, Halgren placed between 
twenty-five and thirty calls to Gonzales's office each day and 
regularly watched her office building.2°O On one occasion, when 
Gonzales wore black clothes to work, Halgren called and told 
her that she looked great in black.201 Finally, on November 
8, 1994, Gonzales's co-workers noticed Halgren outside their 
office and notified the police.202 When he called her office, Gon-
zales kept him on the line.203 He stated, "I'm going to fix you" 
or "I'm going to fix this. "204 The police traced the call to a tele-
phone booth and arrested Halgren while he was on the tele-
phone.205 When they arrested him, Halgren told the police, 
"I'm not a stalker or anything. n206 The police found two knives, 
a small holster, and a rotating light beacon inside Halgren's 
car.207 They also found a Swiss army knife and a badge in his 
pocket.208 
Halgren was arrested and charged with felony stalking.209 
He pleaded not guilty and was convicted by a jury of felony 
stalking in San Diego Superior COurt.210 On Apr. 7, 1995 Hal-
gren was granted five years probation with credit for time 
served.211 Halgren filed a notice of appeal on May 5,1997.212 
2. The Court's Analysis 
At the time of Halgren's conviction, California's antistalking 
law defined "credible threat" several different ways. First, a 
"credible threat" could be a verbal or written threat.213 Second, 
200. See id. 
201. See id. 
202. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1228. 
203. See id. 
204. [d. 
205. See id. 
206. [d. 
207. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1228. 
208. Seeid. 
209. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 105, at 1. 
210. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1226. 
211. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 105, at 1. 
212. See id. 
213. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1229. 
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it could be a threat implied by a pattern of conduct.214 Finally, 
a "credible threat" could be a combination of verbal or written 
statements and conduct.215 Regardless of how the threat was 
conveyed, it must have been made with the intent and the ap-
parent ability to carry out the threat, thereby causing the vic-
tim to reasonably fear for her safety or the safety of her imme-
diate family.216 
On appeal, Halgren challenged California's antistalking 
statute on several grounds. He asserted that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to indicate what type 
of speech was prohibited and because it punished mere expres-
sions of anger or disagreement.217 In addition, he challenged 
the statute as unconstitutionally overbroad, claiming that it 
allowed punishment of ambiguous or unequivocal speech and 
expressions of anger or disagreement.218 
The Court of Appeal first addressed and rejected Halgren's 
vagueness challenge, noting that he took the language of the 
statute out of context.219 The Court addressed the challenge by 
questioning whether a reasonable person of average intelli-
gence could be reasonably certain about what behavior the 
statute prohibited.220 The Court indicated that the statute 
clearly outlined what activities it prohibited. The statute 
plainly states that a stalker must make a "credible threat," and 
the threat (1) must be made with the intent to cause the victim 
to be afraid and (2) must be accompanied by willful, malicious, 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. 
217. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 105, at 11. 
218. See id. 
219. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1229-31. 
220. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1229 citing People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 
4th 391, 400 (1994). In applying this test, the court noted that the requirement of 
reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of commonly used terms. See Heilman, 
25 Cal. App. 4th at 400. 
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and repeated following or harassing of the victim.221 A "credi-
ble threat" alone will not satisfy the elements of the crime.222 
Next, the Court of Appeal addressed the overbreadth chal-
lenge. The Court rejected this challenge as well, concluding 
that California Penal Code section 646.9 does not punish mere 
emotional or angry speech.223 The First Amendment does not 
protect threats that are intended to cause fear. 224 However, it 
does protect political and social discourse.225 Threats are not 
related to political or social discourse.226 When a reasonable 
person would foresee that the content and import of the threat 
will cause the listener to believe that she will be subjected to 
physical violence, the threat is not afforded First Amendment 
protection because it was intended to instill fear.227 
After rejecting Halgren's constitutional challenges, the 
Court of Appeal noted that the trial court's decision was sup-
ported by substantial evidence, focusing on several threats 
made by Halgren during his telephone conversations with Gon-
zales.228 The Court noted that, on one occasion, Halgren told 
Gonzales that she would be sorry she had been rude to him, 
and that she would have to talk to him sometime?29 On an-
other occasion, he told her that he would not continue to let her 
be rude to him, that she would pay for being rude to him, and 
that he was going to "fix her" or "fix this.n230 Finally, on yet 
another occasion, Halgren told Gonzales that he could do what-
ever he wanted to her.231 The Court concluded that these 
threats, when considered in context with the series of phone 
calls and appearances at Gonzales' place of business, were 
made with the intent to place Gonzales in reasonable fear for 
221. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1231. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. 
224. See id. 
225. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 105, at 20. 
226. See id. at 21. 
227. See id. 
228. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1232-33. 
229. See id. at 1233. 
230. [d. 
231. See id. at 1227. 
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her safety. The Court of Appeal affirmed Halgren's stalking 
conviction.232 
Halgren's defense of lack of specific intent could have suc-
ceeded. Under California's specific intent statute, the jury had 
to weigh the evidence of Halgren's following activity and har-
assing phone calls and infer that Halgren intended to cause 
Gonzales to be afraid. The sentencing judge, in support of his 
decision to grant probation, stated that Halgren's behavior 
lacked the "severe terror-inspiring quality" of other stalking 
cases.233 Had the jurors shared this view, they could have in-
ferred that Halgren did not intend to cause Gonzales to be 
afraid, and would have been required to return a verdict of not 
guilty. 
C. A HYPOTHETICAL STALKING CASE UNDER CALIFORNIA'S 
CURRENT ANTISTALKING STATUTE: PEOPLE V. STAN 
The following hypothetical presents a fictitious stalking 
scenario .. It is designed to illustrate a stalking situation that 
could easily arise in California in the future. The purpose of 
this hypothetical is to demonstrate how a specific intent statute 
could fail to protect the victim when the threats and actions of 
the stalker are not "terror-inspiring," but the victim is none-
theless reasonably and honestly afraid for her safety as a result 
of the stalker's intentional acts. 
1. Factual History 
Victoria and Stan were involved in a casual dating relation-
ship for several months before Victoria broke up with Stan. 
232. See id. at 1233. 
233. See Halgren, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1232 n.3. The judge indicated the jury's de-
termination of Halgren's guilt under the statute was valid, but compared to the con-
duct of the defendant in People v. Heilman (in which the defendant, after threatening 
and following the victim for an extended period of time, ambushed her in an elevator, 
shot her at point blank range, and pulled the phone off the wall so that she could not 
call for help). Halgren's behavior "was in fact exceedingly vague, explicitly vague in 
words, and certainly lacked from an outside observer's point of view the severe terror-
inspiring quality that might be demonstrated in other instances of the same crime. I'm 
not meaning in any way to - to make less of what [Gonzales) herself experienced or the 
reasonableness of her own reaction.... [d. 
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Stan, upset by Victoria's termination of the relationship, at-
tempted to renew the relationship. He left several messages on 
Victoria's home telephone answering machine in which he ex-
plained his feelings and asked her to call him so that they could 
talk. However, Victoria did not return his calls. Victoria's un-
responsiveness caused Stan to become frustrated, and he began 
to leave angry messages on her telephone answering machine. 
In one call, he stated, ''You know better than to snub me." In 
another, he said, "I'm not joking around." Victoria still refused 
to return his calls. Instead of letting the matter drop, Stan's 
obsession grew and his telephone messages became more fre-
quent and aggressive. 
As the frequency of the calls increased, Victoria realized 
that Stan was not going to leave her alone, and she began to 
feel genuinely threatened by Stan's behavior. Not knowing 
what else to do, she contacted the police to report the situation 
and seek advice. The police advised Victoria to seek a tempo-
rary restraining order prohibiting Stan from contacting her, 
which she did. The police served Stan with the TRO several 
days later. Stan was infuriated by the order and left a message 
on Victoria's home answering machine stating, "You did a very 
stupid thing. You'll have to be taught a lesson." After this call, 
Victoria was terrified that Stan would actually attempt to hurt 
her. The next day, as Victoria drove to work, she spotted Stan 
driving behind her on the highway. When she arrived at her 
office, she immediately called the police to report Stan's ac-
tions. The police arrested Stan that afternoon at his apartment 
and charged him with felony stalking in violation of a re-
straining order under California's current antis talking statute. 
2. The Court's Analysis 
At trial, the prosecuting attorney will have to prove that 
Stan willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followed or harassed 
Victoria, and that he did so with the specific intent to cause her 
to be afraid for her safety.234 To do this, the prosecuting attor-
ney can point to several acts undertaken by Stan as evidence of 
234. See CPC § 646.9(a). 
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harassing behavior. For example, Stan placed repeated phone 
calls to Victoria's home which included comments such as, "You 
know better than to snub me" and "I'm not joking around." 
These statements, taken out of context, clearly do not posses 
the "terror inspiring quality" that the trial judge in People v. 
Halgren sought as evidence of stalking.235 However, when 
viewed in conjunction with Stan's other actions, including his 
violation of the TRO and his statement, "You'll have to be 
taught a lesson," Stan's behavior, like that of Earl Halgren, 
most likely satisfies the behavioral requirements of the statute. 
However, under California's existing law, proving that the 
stalker engaged in stalking behavior is only half of the battle. 
The prosecuting attorney must additionally prove that Stan 
had the requisite specific intent before a jury can convict him of 
'stalking. Stan could assert that there is insufficient evidence 
of specific intent to support a conviction. Stan would claim 
that he did not intend to scare Victoria by leaving messages on 
her answering machine. Instead, he was expressing his frus-
tration that she had broken off their relationship. He was only 
trying to convince her to renew their relationship by showing 
how much he loved her. Stan would point out that he never 
specifically threatened to hurt Victoria. He might admit that 
the message in which he stated, "You'll have to be taught a les-
son" was irrational and ill-conceived, but was not intended to 
scare Victoria, and was not intended as a threat. Under Cali-
fornia's existing specific intent antistalking statute, if the jury 
believes that Stan was frustrated and angry, but that he didn't 
really intend to scare Victoria, this defense could succeed. 
V. CRITIQUE OF CALIFORNIA'S ANTISTALKING 
STATUTE 
Both the hypothetical scenario and People v. Halgren are 
examples of situations in which California's reliance on specific 
intent could prove inadequate in protecting victims of stalking. 
If the court focuses on the accused stalker's intent, rather than 
235. See Halgren, 52 Cal App. 4th at 1232 n.3. 
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on his behavior, the stalker's lack of specific intent could pro-
vide the stalker with an absolute defense. 
A. CALIFORNIA SHOULD REPLACE THE SPECIFIC INTENT 
STANDARD CURRENTLY FOUND IN ITS ANTISTALKING STATUTE 
WITH A GENERAL INTENT STANDARD. 
If the legislature revises the antistalking statute to incorpo-
rate a general intent standard rather than a specific intent 
standard, the statute will ensure that lack of specific intent 
does not provide a successful defense to one who has intention-
ally engaged in behavior that would otherwise be recognized as 
stalking. The Model Code incorporates such a general intent 
standard. A general intent statute would require the defen-
dant to purposefully engage in activity that would cause a rea-
sonable person to become afraid for her safety, and which actu-
ally causes the victim to be afraid for her safety. Additionally, 
the defendant would have to know, or have reason to know, 
that the person towards whom the activity is directed will be 
placed in reasonable fear for her safety. By making this revi-
sion, the California antistalking statute would more closely 
incorporate the recommendations of the Model Code.236 
Because California's existing statute requires that prosecu-
tors prove specific intent, California prosecutors are forced to 
place significant emphasis on the stalker's motivation, in addi-
tion to focusing on the stalker's activities. This specific intent 
standard is particularly problematic when applied to a stalker 
who does not intend to cause the victim to be afraid. One rea-
son a stalker may not possess the requisite specific intent is 
because his judgment is clouded by a mental disorder. In such 
cases, the stalker's intent may be to initiate or rekindle a rela-
tionship, or express emotions of anger or frustration.237 By 
definition, if the accused stalker's intent is not to cause the vic-
tim to be afraid, California requires a jury to return a verdict of 
236. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PRoJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL AN· 
TISTALKING CODE FOR STATES 47-48 (1993). 
237. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE AssISTANCE, Regional Seminar Series on Developing 
and Implementing Antistalking Codes 98 June 1996. 
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not guilty.238 Therefore, if a stalker's intent is other than the 
inducement of fear in his victim, he is not legally guilty of 
stalking, even if he has undertaken acts that would otherwise 
satisfy the antistalking law. 
Unfortunately, by focusing on the stalker's intent, the Cali-
fornia statute provides a potential escape from liability for peo-
ple whose behavior is clearly harassing or threatening. In 
cases where the stalker's intentional actions have caused an 
innocent person to be honestly afraid for her safety, but the 
actions do not legally qualify as stalking, the stalker's actions 
fall outside the scope of the antis talking statute and the victim 
is unable to take advantage of the protections afforded by the 
statute. Without these statutory protections, the victim's only 
remaining avenues of protection are TRO's and the terrorist 
threat and annoying telephone call statutes. As mentioned 
earlier, these statutes have proven inadequate in stalking 
situations because their application is too narrow to adequately 
address stalking crimes and because they were not designed to 
protect against a series of harassing acts.239 The inadequacy of 
pre-antistalking legislation in combating stalking crimes was 
one of the reasons that California enacted an antistalking stat-
ute in the first place. 
In addition, if found not guilty, a stalker whose actions are 
driven by obsession or mental disorder will not receive the 
medical treatment that is available through California's statu-
tory scheme.240 As mentioned earlier, one of the provisions in 
California's antistalking statute is that the court can order 
psychiatric treatment as a condition of parole.241 If a stalker's 
obsession is driven by a mental disorder, in the absence of psy-
chiatric treatment or counseling, he is likely continue to act on 
that obsession. In fact, the stalker may be more dangerous af-
ter trial because he may be embittered and seek retribution for 
being kept from the victim.242 Therefore, the rehabilitative 
238. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (Deering supp. 1998). 
239. See di.scuasion supra section II.C. 
240. See di.scuasion supra section II.E. 
241. See CPC § 646.9(i). 
242. See N.I.J., supra note 12, at 51. 
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treatment that is available to the stalker through the anti-
stalking statute may be necessary to prevent further harassing 
behavior in the future. 
B. ANTISTALKING STATUTES CONTAINING A GENERAL INTENT 
STANDARD, SUCH AS THAT OF WASHINGTON STATE, HAVE 
PASSED CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 
The State of Washington has an antistalking statute con-
taining a general intent 'provision similar to the one proposed 
in the Model Code.243 In Washington, the victim must rea-
sonably fear that the stalker intends to injure her or another 
person.244 The stalker must either intend to frighten, intimi-
date, or harass the victim or actually know or reasonably 
should know that the person is afraid, intimidated or 
harassed.245 
In June, 1996, the Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed 
the constitutionality of the statute and specifically addressed 
the intent requirement.246 At the trial level, two defendants, 
Brian Yates and Orson Lee, were convicted of stalking in un-
related cases.247 Each defendant contended separately that the 
antis talking statute was unconstitutionally vague and over-
243. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 9A46.1l0 (West Supp. 1998). This Washington 
statute states: 
A person commits the crime of stalking if, without lawful authority and 
under circumstances not amounting to a felony attempt of another 
crime: (a) He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly 
follows another person; and (b) The person being harassed or followed is 
placed in fear that the stalker intends to injure the person, another 
person, or property of the person or of another person. The feeling of 
fear must be one that a reasonable person in the same situation would 
experience under all the circumstances; and (c) The stalker either: (i) 
Intends to frighten, intimidate or harass the person; or (ii) Knows or 
reasonably should know that the person is afraid, intimidated or har-
assed even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or in-
timidate or harass the person. 
[d. 
244. See id. 
245. See id. The statute does not require the stalker to intend to place the victim in 
fear or intimidate or harass the victim. See id. 
246. See State v. Lee, 917 P. 2d 159; 162, 167 (1996). 
247. See id. at 162. 
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broad. The Court combined the appeals and addressed the 
constitutional questions.248 
At the time of Yates' and Lee's convictions, the Washington 
antistalking statute described the crime of stalking as inten-
tional and repeated following of another person to their home, 
school, place of employment, business, or any other location, or 
following the person while she is in transit between 
locations.249 The person being followed must have been intimi-
dated, harassed, or placed in reasonable fear that the stalker 
intended to injure her.25o The stalker must have either in-
tended to frighten, intimidate, or harass the victim .or the 
stalker must have known or should reasonably have known 
that the victim was afraid, intimidated, or harassed, even if the 
stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or intimidate 
or harass her.251 Therefore, a person accused of stalking under 
this statute could be convicted if the prosecution proves one of 
two intents, assuming that the behavior satisfies the harass-
ment requirement. First, the prosecution could win a convic-
tion if it proves that the defendant demonstrated specific intent 
to frighten, intimidate or harass the victim. Alternatively, the 
prosecution could win a conviction if it proves that the defen-
dant intentionally undertook acts that he knew or should have 
248. Seeid. 
249. See id. Although the legislature amended the statute since the time of Lee 
and Yates's convictions, the intent requirement has not been changed. At the time of 
Lee and Yates's convictions, the court quoted the statute as follows: 
(1) A person commits the crime of stalking if, without lawful authority 
and under circumstances not amounting to a felony attempt of another 
crime: (a) He or she intentionally and repeatedly follows another person 
to that person's home, school, place of employment, business, or any 
other location, or follows the person while the person is in transit be-
tween locations; and (b) The person being followed is intimidated, har-
assed, or placed in fear that the stalker intends to injure the person or 
property of the person being followed or of another person. The feeling 
of fear, intimidation, or harassment must be one that a reasonable per-
son in the same situation would experience under all the circumstances; 
and (c) The stalker either: (i) intends to frighten, intimidate, or harass 
the person being followed; or (ii) Knows or reasonably should know that 
the person being followed is afraid, intimidated, or harassed even if the 
stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or intimidate or har-
ass the person. 
[d. 
250. See Lee, 917 P. 2d at 162. This feeling of fear must be one that a reasonable 
person in the same situation would experience under the same circumstances. See id. 
251. See id. (emphasis added). 
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known would cause the victim to feel afraid or harassed. By 
incorporating a general intent alternative, the statute allows 
the prosecution to focus on the stalker's behavior rather than 
on his intent. In doing so, the Washington antis talking statute 
follows the intent recommendation of the Model Code and pro-
vides broader protection to the stalking victim than the current 
California antistalking statute. 
The Washington Court of Appeals' decision provided an in-
depth discussion of the constitutionality of the Washington 
statute's general intent requirement. The appellants chal-
lenged "the statute as vague because it allow[ed] the finder of 
fact to base culpability on the perceptions of others, without 
requiring that the defendant act with a specific intent to cause 
harm."252 The Court rejected this assertion.253 A statute is 
void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of normal intelli-
gence fair notice of what conduct the statute prohibits.2M The 
Court determined that the conduct proscribed by the statute 
was clear.255 In order to win a conviction, the State must show 
that the stalker knew or reasonably should have known that 
his conduct was frightening to his victim.256 The Court rea-
soned that "a person of normal intelligence would be able to 
consider "all the circumstances" and know whether his inten-
tional following causes a sense of fear. »257 The Court concluded 
that "[t]he statute's reliance on an objective test precludes the 
conclusion that it is unconstitutionally vague. lf258 
C. EFFECT OF INCORPORATING A GENERAL INTENT STANDARD 
INTO CALIFORNIA'S ANTISTALKING LAw 
If the California legislature were to remove the antistalking 
statute's specific intent requirement and replace it with a gen-
252. Id. at 167. 
253. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. See Lee, 917 P. 2d at 167. 
256. See id. One way to prove this would be to show that the victim notified the 
stalker that his actions/attentions were unwanted, either through a TRO or direct 
communication. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
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eral intent requirement, the effect would be to eliminate the 
possibility that lack of specific intent could provide a defense to 
harassing and threatening behavior that otherwise satisfies 
the statutory requirements. If California adopts a general in-
tent standard like that found in the Model Code and Washing-
ton's antis talking statute, an accused stalker would satisfy the 
intent requirement as long as he intentionally undertook acts 
that he knew or should have known would cause his victim to 
become afraid.259 The requirement of knowledge would be sat-
isfied if the accused stalker had been informed, either directly 
by the victim or through a TRO or police visit, that his actions 
were causing the victim to be afraid. By incorporating the 
phrase "should have known" into the intent requirement, the 
statute holds stalkers to a reasonable person standard. This is 
intended to prevent an accused stalker from asserting that he 
misunderstood the victim's request to be left alone, or that he 
did not understand the requirements of a TRO. As long as a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have under-
stood, the defendant will be held to have understood. As is the 
situation today, the behavior would still have to actually cause 
the victim to be afraid, and would also have to cause a reason-
able person to be afraid. 
If Halgren had been charged with stalking in violation of 
this proposed general intent statute, he would still have been 
convicted. The same can be said for Stan. Neither would have 
been able to successfully assert lack of specific intent because 
the desired result of the particular activities is irrelevant under 
a general intent standard. Both Halgren and Stan intended 
their actions; neither was forced to make a phone call or follow 
his victim. Both Halgren and Stan knew or should have known 
that their continued contact was unappreciated by his victim: 
Gonzales specifically told Halgren not to call her anymore, and 
Victoria served Stan with a TRO barring any further contact 
between them. Both Halgren and Stan repeatedly telephoned 
their victim and left messages that, in the context of their other 
activities, were reasonably interpreted as threatening. Addi-
tionally, Halgren and Stan both induced actual fear in their 
259. See B.JA, supra note 143 at 95. 
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victim. Therefore, under a general intent statute, both defen-
dants satisfied the elements of the crime of stalking. 
The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that stalkers 
whose activities satisfy the behavioral requirements of stalk-
ing, including repeated following or harassment, combined with 
a credible threat, do not escape prosecution simply because 
they don't possess specific intent. The proposal is not intended 
to allow the criminal justice system to punish individuals who 
are simply angry or expressing frustration, and thereby ex-
pressing their right of free speech. The revised statute would 
still require several instances of harassing behavior. A single 
occurrence would not satisfy the revised statute. Also, the 
credible threat requirement would still exist. The stalker 
would have to make a threat that, when viewed in context with 
several occurrences of harassing behavior, would cause a rea-
sonable person to fear for her safety. The revised statute would 
not be satisfied by individual threats, veiled or direct. Also, the 
requirement of a reasonable person would preclude a jury from 
convicting a defendant of stalking if the victim is overly sensi-
tive or taking the defendant's behavior out of context. By pre-
serving these existing safeguards, the revised antis talking 
statute would continue to protect the rights of defendants. 
However, by changing to a general intent standard, the revised 
statute would better protect stalking victims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Stalking is a potentially dangerous crime that threatens the 
lives of many women each day. Today, California's antistalking 
statute is a comprehensive tool in combating stalking. The 
statute, however, is not without weaknesses. 
The N.I.J. published the Model Code as an example of anti-
stalking legislation that would protect the rights of both stalk-
ers and victims, as well as withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
The drafters of the Model Code believed that a general intent 
standard was preferable to a specific intent standard because it 
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forces the criminal justice system to focus on the behavior of 
the accused stalker, rather than on his motivation.260 This en-
sures that people who purposefully engage in stalking behavior 
do not escape liability because they did not specifically intend 
to cause the victim to be afraid, even if the victim's fear was the 
probable and knowable consequence of the accused stalker's 
actions. 
California should revise its antistalking statute by replacing 
the existing specific intent standard with a general intent 
standard. In doing so, California will close the loophole that is 
currently available to those defendants who intentionally stalk, 
but whose mental state allows them to escape liability under 
existing law. 
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